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Mention the words "Artificial Intelligence" to the practicing
lawyer and the response you may well hear is "Don't tell me that a
machine can do what I do!" In a very realistic sense, Anne Gardner's book "An Artificial Intelligence Approach to Legal Reasoning" responds to the retort with the question, "What is it that you
really do?" The author proceeds to examine the foundation of legal
reasoning skills within the context of developing a computer system
for the purpose of deciding whether two parties have entered into a
binding contract.
The author, who became an attorney before turning to artificial
intelligence, uses a mixture of 200 years of legal philosophy with
state-of-the-art artificial intelligence techniques in the book. This
book is a revision of the author's doctoral dissertation on the subject. For the artificial intelligence professional who has never studied law, Dr. Gardner's discussion of the conflict between legal
positivism and legal realism may seem to lack relevance; indeed, it
may be difficult to follow without having read the works of H.L.A.
Hart or Lon Fuller. For the lawyer who wants to learn about the
possible impact of artificial intelligence on what he or she does, the
book presupposes a good deal of background in the milieu of artificial intelligence. It may be difficult for an attorney to understand
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why he or she should have to read such a theoretical work when
computer software vendors are peddling allegedly "user friendly"
expert systems for automating the practice of law.
Nonetheless, the material is relevant to all professional users or
potential users of artificial intelligence systems. The legal profession presents perhaps the broadest of problem descriptions. Dr.
Gardner compares legal systems with other domains in which data
is collected from more objective sources. For other systems, however, the range of allowable data is strictly limited, at the extreme,
to descriptions of instrument readings. In legal problems the potential data is not limited in this way. The facts are descriptions of
human activity, and it seems impossible to set a prioribounds on the
kinds of facts that may need to be represented because they are relevant to the analysis of a particular problem.1
In order to fully exploit the power of artificial intelligence, the
artificial intelligence "knowledge engineer" must learn how to characterize problems which are dramatically "open textured." He or
she must also learn how to limit the scope of systems and how to
define priorities so as to provide meaningful guidance to the legal
professional in enhancing the quality of legal reasoning.
The lawyer must come to terms with the reality of artificial
intelligence as well. The author believes that it will be years, if ever,
before computerized artificial intelligence will come close to duplicating human reasoning capability. Even so, as the complexity and
volume of legal problems increase, lawyers will be turning to artificial intelligence techniques in order to organize, categorize, and
simplify problems. The work of James Sprowl at Chicago-Kent
Law School has already demonstrated that the quality of repetitive
legal work product may be improved through computer techniques
which are readily available today. If more lawyers can get through
works like Dr. Gardner's, legal expert systems may soon be developed to solve problems which lawyers and judges currently have to
solve themselves on a day-by-day basis.
While the initial chapters of the book deal primarily with the
philosophical underpinnings of legal analysis, the balance of the
book deals with computerizing that bugaboo of first year law
school: "Is there an enforceable contract?" Dr. Gardner demonstrates that, in fact, the introductory contracts course may present
the most difficult intellectual challenge to an artificial intelligence
system. The task of answering a law school contracts essay ques1.
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tion must be divided into three tasks: (1) parsing the narrative question into meaningful statements of fact, (2) recognizing issues
present in the facts, and (3) identifying conflicting rules or principles which must be resolved in order to find an overall solution.
She shows how the second of the above tasks may be the least
challenging. Parsing narratives, however, requires not only a preliminary filter for determining legal relevance, but also a species of
"common sense knowledge" which may rapidly outweigh the body
of more formal legal knowledge. In like manner, the third task
may be overwhelming because competing social considerations may
result in the development of rules which are in direct conflict to one
another. Any legal expert system will thereby have to be able to not
only recognize and resolve some conflicts, but also be able to identify the limits of its capabilities and state conflicting arguments.
Dr. Gardner's skeletal contracts analysis system attempts to
deal with the first two tasks and to provide a backbone for resolving
the third task. Working with a combination of rules embodied in
the Restatement Second of Contracts, a limited grammar and vocabulary for describing offer and acceptance problems, and a primitive mechanism for abstracting and representing case paradigms,
she shows how a system can be built to walk through a fairly common type of contract question.
In order to deal with the "simple" problem of offer and acceptance, she has developed a generalized "augmented transition network" which defines a sequence of "states" and "events." As the
narrative of the examination question is parsed in chronological order, each "event" is analyzed to see whether it establishes a state
(e.g., an offer is outstanding) or removes a state (e.g., the offer is
withdrawn). The actions constituting the event may or may not be
"effective" depending on the state of the system preceding the
event. Thus, actions otherwise sounding like an "acceptance" may
be ineffective because the offer was withdrawn or expired after a
reasonable time.
The logical extension of such a transition network is more than
the familiar "flow chart," or "decision tree," computer users have
come to know over the years. It provides a framework for building
up layers of additional expertise and refining the analysis without
requiring a total restructuring of the tree.
The current technological limitations of such a system are
shown to be substantial. Law students are trained to discern many
concepts intuitively. Those concepts must be formalized and ren-
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dered explicit in order to effectively automate the legal reasoning
process.
The output of Dr. Gardner's system appears to be quite primitive, compared to the content of even that produced by the newest
law student. The narrative questions must first be hand-coded into
a highly-stylized language which, the author admits, involves the
application of a significant body of legal knowledge. The output of
the system merely lists the discernible final "states" at the end of the
narrative.
Even so, it does not take too much imagination to extrapolate
her techniques into many practical problems. In narrow domains of
expertise, such as tax, products liability, and securities regulation,
the vocabulary of problem description is not the entirety of human
activity. Instead, the user is concerned that, in managing a complicated legal analysis, a variant in the facts might cause the addition
or deletion of one or more "states." Thus, a prerequisite of a securities law exemption might suddenly appear or disappear, or a corporate reorganization might suddenly create a "boot." By tackling
primitive and open textured legal structures, Dr. Gardner can help
lawyers and artificial intelligence professionals learn to identify similar types of problems which might arise in far less ambitious
projects, such as those listed above.
Dr. Gardner's work is not the first on the block. Professor L.
Thorne McCarty of Rutgers began to publish works on the application of artificial intelligence techniques to law more than a decade
ago. He showed how rule-based techniques could be used to characterize relatively sophisticated tax problems involving corporate
reorganizations. Professor McCarty (who is the co-editor of the series to which Dr. Gardner's book belongs) has since expanded his
work to deal with more primitive, and hence more difficult, concepts. The bulk of his published work, however, has dealt with the
relatively narrow domain of corporate tax law.
By focusing on legal reasoning more fundamental to the training of a lawyer, Dr. Gardner has opened up a more theoretical and
a more practical line of inquiry. Only when artificial intelligence
techniques are capable of dealing with those fundamental issues will
legal expert systems become fully automated "partners" in the practice of law.
At a recent conference on computerization for practicing attorneys, more than one hundred lawyers attended a seminar on expert
systems. To be sure, some were there because of the "Gee, Mr.
Wizard" syndrome. The vast majority, however, had been reading
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advertisements for so-called legal expert systems and were there to
learn when and how they could put artificial intelligence techniques
to practical use in their respective law firms. Major law firms are
beginning to develop expert systems in narrow problem areas.
Anne Gardner's book is not likely to be terribly useful to those
who are chafing at the bit to implement legal expert systems. Because it started as a doctoral dissertation, it presupposes too much
knowledge of artificial intelligence techniques. It also suffers from
the prolix writing style encouraged in that milieu. It is a start, however, and can be very valuable even to the system developer, provided that developer is committed to understanding the expertise he
or she is modeling.
What is needed is a practical extension or translation of what
Dr. Gardner learned in her investigations. She is in the enviable
position of having a deep understanding of artificial intelligence and
an understanding of what it means to be a practicing lawyer. She
should be encouraged to write another book which would look at
the current platforms for developing legal expert systems and explain to potential users the fundamentals which define the scope of
viable legal expert systems. In the meantime, the lawyer who has a
rudimentary knowledge of artificial intelligence techniques should
seriously consider taking the time and effort to concentrate on "An
Artificial Intelligence Approach to Legal Reasoning."

